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Introduction
In 1972, James Tobin proposed a small, uniform tax on all foreign exchange transactions. J. Tobin argued that the absence of any consensus on fundamentals in foreign exchange markets in combination with low transaction costs and the limited rationality of market participants transforms the price discovery process into a "game of guessing what other traders are going to think" (Tobin, 1978) . However, if investors form their expectations at least partially based on the perceived expectations of other market participants, it would create positive feedback that may cause price misalignments and excessive volatility. Because most speculative transactions are made on a very short-term basis, Tobin believed that a small tax imposed on every transaction could dissuade most short-term speculators and consequently stabilize the market.
Many participants in the global economy find the promise of more predictable exchange rates appealing. Therefore, it is unsurprising that since 1972, a transaction tax levied on foreign exchange markets (henceforth referred to as the Tobin tax) has been frequently discussed. The most recent example is China, which is considering adopting the Tobin tax to protect the Yuan against speculative capital flows (Regan, 2014, via Bloomberg) . Despite the vivid public debate over the possible effects of the tax, academic scrutiny had remained relatively scant.
The most straightforward way to assess the impact of the Tobin tax is to examine some real world impositions of such a tax. Unfortunately, the time series necessary to do so are not available, as the Tobin tax has never been implemented. Aliber et al. (2003) nevertheless developed an innovative method for estimating transaction costs using foreign exchange futures and concluded that transaction costs (such as the Tobin tax) are positively associated with exchange rate volatility. In addition to the work of Aliber et al. (2003) , several authors have also conducted studies addressing transaction costs on stock markets and obtained rather conflicting results (e.g., Umlauf, 1993; Hau, 2006; Liu and Zhu, 2009) . Interpreting these results is even more difficult because stock markets differ substantially from foreign exchange markets in terms of trading volumes and their microstructure. It is therefore not apparent whether these studies have any bearing on the Tobin tax.
Because the empirical evidence is sparse, researchers have employed various theoretical models to address the question of how the Tobin tax might alter exchange rate dynamics. Heterogeneous agent models have proven particularly fruitful in this regard, as such models are able to generate time series that are qualitatively similar to those observed in real markets. Ultimately, it would be nonsensical to examine the impact of the Tobin tax on trading volume or endogenous volatility using a model that is incapable of generating either. In this paper, we extend existing agent-based research regarding the Tobin tax by exploring the possible impacts of the tax in a market cleared by a Walrasian auctioneer-settings that, to the best of our knowledge, have yet to be examined in any extant study and that might be, as we will argue below, more realistic than other frequently adopted clearing mechanisms. This modification is motivated by recent research demonstrating the substantial importance of the market clearing mechanism and liquidity provision when evaluating the impact of the Tobin tax.
There is broad consensus that the Tobin tax would reduce market depth, which may in turn increase volatility, as the price impact of a single order will be larger (e.g., Doyne Farmer et al., 2004) . Proponents of the Tobin tax typically argue that because foreign exchange markets have relatively high depth, this effect will be negligible compared with the change in volatility originating from the change in the composition of the population of traders. While most studies explicitly model the structure of the trader population, few account for the taxs effect on volatility 1 through market liquidity. This omission occurs because most studies explore the impact of the tax in a dealership market in which the market price is determined using a price impact function that is constant with respect to total trading volume. This danger of systematically overestimating the positive effect of the Tobin tax was noted by Ehrenstein et al. (2005) , who demonstrated that under a more realistic price impact function 1 that decreases with respect to total trading volume 2 , the Tobin tax can have either negative or positive effects on volatility depending on how sensitive the price impact function is with respect to total trading volume. These results seriously challenge conclusions drawn from previous models. Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) further supports the findings of Ehrenstein et al. (2005) by exploring the impact of the Tobin tax on a population of agents interacting in either a continuous double auction or in a dealership market. In a dealership market in which the market maker provides abundant liquidity, the Tobin tax reduces volatility. In a continuous double auction with endogenous liquidity provision, the otherwise stabilizing effect of the Tobin tax is offset by the reduction in market depth. The results of Pellizzari and Westerhoff (2009) were replicated in a laboratory experiment using human subjects by Kirchler et al. (2011) , rendering the conclusions particularly sound.
In addition to studies focusing solely on the link between market microstructure and the impact of the Tobin tax, a variety of other research papers also indirectly support the claim that the models clearing mechanism and liquidity provision might be the key determinants of whether the Tobin tax can successfully stabilize the market. Because different authors naturally employ slightly different agent-based models, we can investigate the relationship between the structure of each model and its results. A majority of researchers have explored the impact of the Tobin tax using a dealership market framework with a price impact function that is constant with respect to total trading volume and, consistent with our expectations, found that the tax reduces volatility. The Tobin taxs ability to stabilize the market was reported, e.g., in Ehrenstein (2002) , Westerhoff (2003) , Westerhoff (2004b) , Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) , Demary (2006) , 3 Westerhoff (2008) , Bianconi et al. (2009), and Demary (2010) . Most recently, Flaschel et al. (2015) confirmed the ability of the Tobin-like tax to stabilize the market in a broader macroeconomic setting.
While the impact of the Tobin tax appears to be clear when only considering dealership markets, we observe a notably different picture when examining agent-based models exploring the impact of the Tobin tax in the continuous double auction framework, which allows for endogenous liquidity provision. Mannaro et al. (2005) and Mannaro et al. (2008) demonstrated that under a double auction-like mechanism, the Tobin tax increases price volatility. Further, considering a similar setting, Lavička et al. (2013) reported that the tax increases volatility while simultaneously reducing the kurtosis of returns. Results more in line with the expectations of Tobin tax proponents were obtained by Hein et al. (2006) .
Motivated by the evident importance of the market microstructure, we chose to explore the impact of the tax imposed on a market that is cleared by a Walrasian auctioneer instead of a double auction or the simple price impact function. The reason that we chose to explore the Tobin tax in this particular setting is twofold. First, actual foreign exchange markets are not organized as pure continuous double auctions or dealership markets, as one might expect based on the above paragraphs. A simplified version of the structure of a foreign exchange market is depicted in Figure 1 . Dealers continuously update twoway quotes for their customers and thus act as market makers. Moreover, dealers trade with one another either via brokers (in a continuous double auction fashion) or directly using systems such as EBS or Reuters. Intra-dealer trading accounted for approximately 39% of total trading volume in 2013 (BIS, 2013) . While this relatively large figure 4 was the basis of criticism regarding extensive speculation on foreign exchange markets, it is not entirely true that such trading is primarily of a speculative nature. Instead, intra-dealer trading represents the tedious task of passing undesired inventories (originated by a single, possibly speculative, customer-dealer trade) along until they encounter a dealer with the opposite undesired position, such that they neutralize one another (Flood, 1994) . This phenomenon is conveniently termed "hot potato trading" in the literature. In addition, dealers generally change their positions dramatically throughout the trading day, but at the end of the day, a majority of them have a zero net position, just as they began the day (Cheung et al., 2004) . Considering these two points, one could easily gain the impression that the intra-day trading among dealers and the adjustment of quotes for customers is some sort of intricate tâtonnement process of searching for the price under which all customers would hold desired positions with respect to their expectations and, simultaneously, none of the dealers, which together represent "the auctioneer", would be exposed to exchange rate risk.
A second, subtler point is that by using the Walrasian clearing, we bypass determining a precise form for the price impact function and its relationship with liquidity. This approach is convenient because such a function is often difficult to estimate (e.g., Westerhoff, 2004a) and may affect the measured impact of the Tobin tax substantially (Ehrenstein et al., 2005) .
Overall, to study the effects of a Tobin tax imposed on the retail market, it seems appropriate as well as convenient to approximate the interbank market by means of a Walrasian auctioneer. Thus, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and extends it by incorporating transaction costs in the optimization problem faced by retail traders. In Section 3, the calibration method is described, and multiple simulation runs are performed to assess the impact of the Tobin tax on selected statistics. Section 4 concludes.
Model
To study how the Tobin tax would alter price dynamics in a market cleared by a Walrasian auctioneer, we extend a heterogeneous agent model 5 of foreign exchange developed by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) . The original model is composed of a continuum of boundedly rational, riskaverse agents who optimize their portfolios based on anticipated exchange rate developments. They form their expectations using two distinct forecasting rules, and at the end of a trading round, they compare the accuracy of these rules and possibly switch from one rule to another. An ongoing competition between the forecasting rules creates chaotic price movements not dissimilar to those observed in real foreign exchanges, which make the model suitable for an examination of how these dynamics would be affected by the Tobin tax.
To assess the impact of the Tobin tax, we need to slightly modify the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) . For obvious reasons, we extend the model to include transaction costs in the optimization problem faced by agents. Additionally, we consider the market to be populated by a finite number of agents to facilitate simulation, and we add stochastic noise to the system. To enhance comprehensibility, we set the interest rates of both countries to zero. A slightly more general model allowing for different, exogenously determined interest rates can be easily obtained but is not particularly insightful for our purposes. In addition, we set the transaction costs of the goods market C at zero to facilitate the computations. Despite these changes, with a suitable parameterization, the two models coincide, and our model can therefore be considered to be a generalization of the model developed by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) (conditioned on C = 0) that allows for financial transaction costs.
Although the description in this section should be sufficient to understand the model, we advise that the reader also consult the work of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) , in which the original model is presented in conjunction with numerous valuable insights concerning its dynamics. In the following paragraphs, we primarily focus on modifications to the original model.
Portfolio Optimization
The model is populated by N boundedly rational, risk-averse agents. The utility function of the i-th agent is defined as follows:
where W i t+1 represents the agent's wealth at time t + 1. E i t and V i t are the conditional expectations and conditional variance operators, respectively. µ is a positive parameter capturing the degree of risk aversion. Agents in the model optimize their portfolios based on anticipated exchange rate developments. In each trading round, individual agents can choose to allocate their wealth to either the domestic currency or the foreign currency. The wealth of agent i at time t + 1 is therefore naturally specified as follows:
where d i t are holdings of the foreign currency at time t, and s t is the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency at time t. τ is an ad valorem transaction tax. The second term on the right-hand side of Equation 2 represents the agents exposure to exchange rate movements. The third term is a novelty compared to the original model. It represents the additional cost of changing positions due to the transaction tax τ . The cost is proportional to the change in the position and the price, i.e., the transaction tax is paid in terms of the domestic currency and by both parties participating in the transaction.
From Equation 2, it is immediately apparent that the model is asymmetric with respect to currencies. All agents compute their wealth in terms of the domestic currency, which is therefore considered to be safe with respect to exchange rate movements. This model could therefore represent a reasonable approximation of reality when considering, for example, two currencies, one that is widely used and another of only regional importance. Please also note that the selling price of the foreign currency is equal to the buying price in Equation 2, i.e., spreads are omitted from the model. While this scenario is certainly unrealistic, a model with non-zero endogenously determined spreads would be difficult to design and analyze.
Maximizing utility with respect to holdings of the foreign currency d i t yields individual demands for the foreign currency at time t for a given E i t (s t+1 ) and V i t (s t+1 ):
A straightforward interpretation of Equation 3 is that for an exchange rate at time t suggested by the Walrasian auctioneer that does not sufficiently deviate from the expected exchange rate (adjusted for the current position), agent i chooses to refrain from trading because the expected realized profit from the change in positions would not exceed the transaction cost τ |d i t − d i t−1 |s t . However, if the price offered in the tâtonnement process is sufficiently smaller (larger) than the i-th agent's expectation of the exchange rate, the agent buys (sells) the foreign currency to realize a profit (minimize loss).
Clearing Mechanism
Let Z t be the exogenously determined supply of the foreign currency at time t. Then any
t (s t ) = Z t is said to be a clearing price. For τ = 0, the model is identical to De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and the unique clearing price can be expressed as
However, at τ > 0, one encounters several difficulties. First, the clearing price s t may no longer be unique, as is obvious from Equation 3. Second, although for all possible clearing prices, there exists a closed-form expression analogous to Equation 4, this expression becomes exponentially more complex at increasing levels of time t. 6 The complexity of the form of the clearing price is fortunately bounded by the number of agents N , which is why we choose to populate the model with a finite number of agents rather than with a continuum of agents as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) . In our model, we define the market clearing price at time t as the midpoint between the lowest and the highest possible clearing price.
Forecasting Rules and Risk Evaluation
Having selected the agent's utility functions and the clearing mechanism, we need to determine how agents form their opinions regarding the future exchange rate. In reality, traders lack the computational capabilities to solve demanding problems such as the computation of the expected exchange rate conditional on the information set available to the agent. 7 Instead, human behavior is better described as rule governed-individuals possess several simple heuristics to perform a particular task and choose between them based on their performance (see e.g., Simon, 1990) .
Two main types of heuristics for predicting the exchange rate were identified in foreign exchange markets: fundamental and technical analysis (e.g., Frankel and Froot, 1990) . Traders using technical analysis (henceforth referred to as chartists) infer the future exchange rate based on past price movements and are to a great extent the target group that Tobin intended to impair due to their supposedly destabilizing behavior. Traders using fundamental analysis (henceforth referred to as fundamentalists), by contrast, assume the convergence of the market price to some fundamental value and are believed to be stabilizing the market. Questionnaire surveys suggest that most traders in foreign exchange markets are familiar with both types of analysis and consider them to be equally important (e.g., Taylor and Allen, 1992; Oberlechner, 2001 ). In our model, we will follow De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and approximate these two ample families of forecasting heuristics using two simple forecasting rules. Furthermore, we add an autoregressive stochastic term to the original equations to address the persistent variability of forecasting heuristics within families.
Following De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), we define the expectations of the i-th trader using the fundamental forecasting rule concerning the exchange rate in period t + 1 as
6 This complexity develops because of how agents switch between different forecasting rules, as described in Section 2.3 and because individual demands also depend on past positions.
7 Consider, for example, the original model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) , in which a discontinuity and fractal borders between different equilibria give rise to chaotic price movements that are unpredictable unless we possess infinitely precise estimates of the models parameters. This result is striking because this property is observable even within a deterministic version of the model. In a stochastic and less sharply defined market more closely resembling real foreign exchange markets, this difficulty in computing the expected exchange rate would be even more severe.
where the parameter ψ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the expected speed of an adjustment towards the fundamental value s * t−1 , the term e i,F t captures different beliefs within the group of fundamentalists and the parameter λ F ∈ [0, 1] determines the persistence of different beliefs within the fundamentalist group.
Similarly, the expectations of the i-th trader using the chartist forecasting rule concerning the exchange rate in period t + 1 can be expressed as follows:
An intuitive explanation for Equation 8 is that chartists are attempting to extrapolate the future exchange rate from past exchange rate changes. The parameters a j ; j ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., T C } and the overall strength of the extrapolation β ∈ (0, 1) are assumed to be positive-if a chartist experienced a past price increase, he is most likely to expect the exchange rate to increase further. The term e i,F t again captures different beliefs within the group of chartists. Two aspects are worth further discussion. First, as one can see, when predicting the exchange rate in period t + 1, agents do not use information concerning the exchange rate in period t because it is yet to be determined based on their decision at time t. This process accords with Equations 3 and 5. Second, all agents keep track of both their fundamental and chartist expectations, regardless of whether they are currently chartists or fundamentalists. Otherwise, they would not be able to compare the accuracy of these forecasting rules. Naturally, only the expectations matching the current type of agent are used to determine individual demand, which can be expressed by an indicator function I in the following manner:
where I(i, t) = 1 iff the i -th trader at time t is a fundamentalist 0 iff the i -th trader at time t is a chartist .
Now, we turn to the way in which individual agents evaluate the risk of their portfolios. The conditional exchange rate variance of the fundamentalist V i,F t (s t+1 ) and chartist V i,C t (s t+1 ) is determined by the proportion of exchange rate movements that cannot be explained by fundamentalist and chartist expectations, respectively, i.e.,
The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) is used such that agents place greater weight on the most recent forecasting errors. Combining equations 12 and 13, we obtain
Fitness of the Rules
To complete the model, we specify the function I(i, t), i.e., how an agent decides whether to be a chartist or a fundamentalist. In line with the models ability to generate unpredictable dynamics, we will assume that agents are incapable of computing the most profitable rule ex ante and instead employ a trial and error method. To be more precise, agents evaluate the past profitability of forecasting rules and tend to choose the one that performed better. The probability that agent i is a fundamentalist or a chartist, respectively, at time t is defined as follows:
where π * i,F t−1 and π * i,C t−1 are the risk-adjusted profits from agent i being either a fundamentalist or a chartist at time t − 1. The parameter γ ∈ [0, ∞) is often referred to as the intensity of choice in the literature and measures the intensity with which traders revise their forecasting rules (Brock and Hommes, 1998) . By setting γ = 0, agents become insensitive to past profitability, and the probability of an agent being either a fundamentalist or a chartist is constant and equal to 0.5. However, as γ → ∞, agents choose whatever forecasting rule proved to be more profitable in the previous trading round. Negative values of γ are not economically meaningful.
We define the risk-adjusted profit of chartists and fundamentalists on a per-unit basis as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006):
and Equations 15 and 16 complete the model (provided that s * t and Z t are exogenously determined) and in conjunction with equations 1-14 form a non-linear system of stochastic difference equations. As is frequently experienced in heterogeneous agent modeling, the system is difficult to examine analytically. Thus, we employ numerical methods to assess the impact of the parameter τ on selected statistics of exchange rate realizations s t . 
Simulations

Calibration 8
The above-presented model has 9 parameters, and the impact of the Tobin tax on the statistics generated by the model may differ depending on which exact parameter settings we consider. To narrow the space of possible parameterizations, we calibrate the model such that the time series generated by the model mimic selected statistics of real exchange rates. To do so, we focus on four statistics of returns (i.e., r t = st−s t−1 st ), namely,
• autocorrelation of raw returns:
• autocorrelation of absolute returns:
There are of course many interesting statistical properties of foreign exchange returns (for an extensive survey, see Sewell, 2011) , but the four statistics presented above capture the most fundamental characteristics. Therefore, they can be used as a rough measure for assessing the similarity of the time series generated by the model and real-world data. The calibration itself is performed via genetic algorithms minimizing the following fitness function with respect to the vector of parameters p = (µ, ψ, λ F , σ 2 F , β, θ, γ):
The estimates sd, kurt, ρ r , ρ |r| and their standard errors denoted by SE were obtained from a dataset published by the Czech National Bank (ČNB, 2014) containing the daily exchange rates of 34 different currencies vis-à-vis the Czech Koruna (CZK) throughout 250 trading days (2. Jan 2013-27. Dec 2013; 7 Nov 2013 is omitted due to an exchange rate intervention) and are depicted in Table 1 . 10 8 Due to the nature of the computational methods used in this section, we are unable to describe every aspect associated with the calibration and subsequent analysis in detail. The following paragraphs are therefore intended to acquaint the reader with the methods we employed rather than to provide an exhaustive description. We will nevertheless gladly provide the interested reader with additional files such as datasets, log files, source code for the model and the random seeds employed upon request. 9 To facilitate the calibration, both types of traders are assumed to be identical with respect to persistence and the level of heterogeneity in their expectations (i.e., λF = λC , σ 2 F = σ 2 C ). In addition, vector α is adopted from De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) . Parameters N , Zt and s * t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., T } are assumed to be constant and are set to 100, 0, and 1, respectively. 10 The estimations are performed using Stata 12 software (Stata, 2011) . Notes: The standard errors of sd and kurt are obtained via the bootstrap method (10 000 re-samplings). The last column captures the ability of the calibrated model to reproduce the target statistics. Averages of the statistic under p = p 0 were obtained from 1000 simulation runs lasting 3400 trading rounds.
We perform a search consisting of more than 2 · 10 5 independent model runs with varying lengths, totaling more than 8.5 · 10 7 trading rounds (an equivalent of 2.5 · 10 5 years). 11 The parameter settings p 0 , the individual coordinates of which are depicted in Table 2 , performed the best in terms of the fitness function (Equation 20) compared to all other parameter settings that we considered. Table 1 illustrates that the model under the parameter settings p 0 is capable of mimicking the target statistic quite closely and is therefore suitable for the analysis. However, before we turn to simulations to evaluate the impact of the Tobin tax, it is necessary to stress two possible shortcomings of the calibration we performed. The diverse results we obtained from multiple searches indicate that the parameter space was to some degree left unexplored. It is therefore more appropriate to regard p 0 as the best parameter setting given the computational restrictions we face, rather than the best setting.
Second, the similarity in the statistics presented above is a necessary but not sufficient condition for capturing the true underlying process generating exchange rate dynamics. This problem is inherently present when examining complex systems, and aside from carefully designing the model, there is little we can do to address this issue. Despite these objections, we believe that the model under p = p 0 yields interesting insights into the possible impact of the Tobin tax in real markets.
Results
The model under p = p 0 is capable of generating rich time series that exhibit properties such as excess volatility or persistent departures from the fundamental value. One such realization is depicted in Figure 11 in Appendix A. We choose to analyze the impact of the Tobin tax τ on four statistics of exchange rate realizations that are frequently discussed in relation to the Tobin tax:
The impact on volatility is a central question in the debate over the Tobin tax. While proponents of the tax argue that it could reduce volatility, the evidence appears to be mixed (see section 1).
•
Distortions measure the degree of mispricing in the time series. It is useful to distinguish two distinct sources of distortions: unceasing, erratic oscillations around the fundamental value caused by the noise within the model and occasional, persistent, one-sided deviations driven by the positive feedback in expectations of the chartists. The latter is characterized by a sudden drop in the popularity of the fundamentalist forecasting rule. Figure 11 in Appendix A depicts the formation and the subsequent correction of one such persistent deviation.
Kurtosis is addressed here because several research papers indicate that the Tobin tax might have opposite effects on volatility and kurtosis. The results of Demary (2006) suggest that the Tobin tax reduces volatility but increases the kurtosis of returns. Conversely, Lavička et al. (2013) reported that the Tobin tax increases volatility but decreases kurtosis.
The direction of the impact of the Tobin tax on traded volume is hardly a controversial issue. Nonetheless, the degree to which volume would be affected is often discussed, as it is crucial for estimating the possible revenues from the tax.
To assess the impact of the Tobin tax on the aforementioned statistics, we perform 1000 simulation runs lasting 340 trading rounds for each of 51 different values of τ ranging from 0 to 1% (i.e., 0.02% steps) under p = p 0 . The 10 th and 90 th percentiles of the measured statistics for different values of τ are depicted in figures 2, 5, 3, and 6. The charts also contain estimates of the means of the statistics and their 95% confidence intervals. To allow for an easy comparison of effects from the tax across different statistics, we chose to present the statistics in relative terms-the scenario τ = 0 is treated as the baseline. Figure 2 indicates that the effect of the Tobin tax on volatility is ambivalent. For values ranging from 0 to 0.3%, the tax negligibly (yet statistically significantly) increases the average volatility. For values between 0.3% and 1%, the tax delivers a moderate (up to 10%) decrease in volatility. This relationship between the magnitude of the tax and its qualitative effect has not, to the best of our knowledge, been reported by any agent-based model applied to the Tobin tax. Unfortunately, it is difficult to precisely determine the cause of this intriguing behavior.
The Tobin tax also appears to be quite successful in eliminating mispricing. As Figure 3 illustrates, the Tobin tax reduces distortions by up to 30% in the case of a 1% tax. Interestingly, the Tobin tax has a much greater effect on the second component of distortions long-lasting, onesided deviations. Figure 4 shows the decomposition of total distortions according to the length of the individual deviations from the fundamental value for values of τ ∈ {0, 0.005, 0.01}. As is apparent from the figure, the Tobin tax actually slightly increases the portion of distortions that originated from very short-term deviations lasting less than 2 periods. However, as we examine increasingly longer deviations, we see that the Tobin tax has a much stronger effect. Contributions from deviations lasting 20-30 periods are reduced by approximately half, and persistent deviations lasting more than 30 periods (such as that depicted in Figure 11 in Appendix A) appear to be almost eliminated.
At this point, it might be worthwhile to discuss the relationship between such persistent deviations and the phenomenon of speculative bubbles. Similar to what is commonly believed to be the main feature of speculative bubbles, these persistent deviations are endogenously generated by positive feedback in the process of expectation formation. Nonetheless, because there is no universal agreement on the precise definition of a bubble, we are reluctant to denote it as such; instead, we will simply refer to it as a persistent deviation. One possible avenue for further research is to examine whether these persistent deviations indeed exhibit other properties that can be attributed to speculative bubbles, such as the steady rate of building up followed by a rapid correction.
In line with Lavička et al. (2013) , we found that the Tobin tax is better at reducing the kurtosis of returns than their volatility. A tax of only 0.1 % is able to reduce the average kurtosis by 8%. This effect gradually increases for larger values of the tax. The impact of the Tobin tax on traded volume is, as expected, negative. A 1% tax reduces the average trading volume by more than 50%. This effect appears to be almost linear. Notes: The reduction of total distortions by 15% in the case of a 0.5% tax and by 29% in the case of a 1% tax is not achieved by uniformly reducing all of the components of distortions. Instead, the effect on long-lasting deviations is much stronger than in the case of short-term deviations. A 1% Tobin tax appears to almost eliminate any deviations lasting more than 30 periods, while contributions from deviations lasting only 1-2 periods actually slightly increase. Notes: A statistically significant decrease in mean traded volume (whiskers represent the 90% confidence interval) for values of τ ∈ [0.02%, 1%] (up to 50% in the case of a 1% tax). The chart is scaled such that the relative volume in the scenario τ = 0 is equal to 1. The scale factor (i.e., the average volume under τ = 0) is 659.3.
Sensitivity Analysis
Thus far, we have assumed that the fundamental value is constant. We made this assumption because it is a reasonable starting point for analyzing the dynamics of the model. In reality, the fundamental value likely fluctuates, especially over longer periods of time. It is therefore necessary to determine whether our results also hold when the fundamental value follows some random process. To do so, we replicated the simulations we performed to construct figures 2, 5, 3, and 6, but we allow the fundamental value to follow a Gaussian random walk with zero mean and standard deviation 2 · 10 −3 , 4 · 10 −3 , and 6 · 10 −3 . 12 Figures 7, 8, 9 , and 10 capture how the Tobin tax affects volatility, distortions, kurtosis, and volume under scenarios with different degrees of volatility in the fundamental value. The figures display the sample median 13 rather than the sample average of the statistics because the former has been demonstrated to be less prone to random noise. The sample average would provide a similar, yet less clear story and might even be misleading because it is impossible to clearly present the additional statistics necessary to interpret it in a single chart.
The directions of the effects on all examined statistics are robust to the volatility of the fundamental value. Interestingly, the ability of the Tobin tax to reduce both volatility and, especially, distortions appears to be inversely related to the volatility of the fundamental value. This relationship is sensible because the tax reduces the ability of the market exchange rate to rapidly adjust to new levels. While this reduced response subdues erratic oscillations of the market exchange rate, it also reduces the ability of the exchange rate to rapidly adjust to new levels when the fundamental value changes. This effect can have considerable implications for scenarios with high levels of fundamental volatility (see Figure 8) . Nonetheless, even in the scenario 6 · 10 −3 , the tax can still significantly reduce distortions, as its ability to prevent the occurrence of long-lasting deviations remains unaffected. The volatility of the fundamental value has no impact on the ability to reduce traded volume and a non-trivial impact on the ability to reduce the kurtosis of returns.
12 For comparison, the estimated standard deviation of actual foreign exchange returns is approximately 6 · 10 −3 . 13 In line with convention, we define the median as the average of the two middle observations because it is computed from an even number of observations. An insignificant yet hopefully enlightening comment on that note is that Stigler (1977) filled the much-needed gap in the literature and termed this pair of central observations the "comedians". The extent to which he was joking remains unclear (Stata, 2014) . Notes: The ability of the Tobin tax to reduce distortions is inversely related to the volatility of the fundamental value. This relationship is caused by the trade-off between reducing volatility and reducing distortions in scenarios with high levels of fundamental volatility. The chart is scaled such that the relative volatility in scenario τ = 0 is equal to 1 for each value of σ. Notes: The ability of the Tobin tax to reduce volume is unaffected by the volatility of the fundamental value-the individual plots almost perfectly coincide. The chart is scaled such that the relative volatility in scenario τ = 0 is equal to 1 for each value of σ.
Conclusion
The question of how transaction costs affect price dynamics is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective but is also of practical importance, as certain regulators are currently considering imposing such a tax. Motivated by recent research demonstrating the substantial importance of the market microstructure when imposing a Tobin tax, we explore the impact of the tax in an artificial market cleared by a Walrasian auctioneer. This setting resembles the twolayered structure of real foreign exchanges more closely than a price impact function, which is often adopted in studies on the Tobin tax. In addition, by using Walrasian clearing, we circumvent the troublesome decision concerning the precise form of the price impact function, which has a substantial influence on the results. The impact of the Tobin tax on exchange rate dynamics in this particular setting has, to the best of our knowledge, not been examined in any study to date.
To evaluate the impact of the tax, we extend the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) by including transaction costs. The original model consists of boundedly rational agents who apply a blend of fundamental and technical analyses to predict the future exchange rate. The ongoing competition between the forecasting rules creates chaotic price movements not dissimilar to those observed in real foreign exchange markets. The calibrated model exhibits features typical of real foreign exchange markets such as excess kurtosis and volatility, autocorrelation of absolute returns and no autocorrelation in raw returns.
By performing multiple simulations, we found that the tax is capable of reducing average distortions (by up to 29% in the case of a 1% tax) and average excess kurtosis (by up to 12% in the case of a 1% tax). This result is primarily achieved by eliminating long-lasting deviations from the fundamental value -something one could loosely refer to as speculative bubbles. The effect of the tax on average volatility is more complex. We found that for small values of the tax (0%-0.3%), it delivers a negligible, but statistically significant, increase in volatility, while for larger values (0.3%-1%), the tax decreases average volatility by up to 10% in the case of a 1% tax. As expected, the Tobin tax notably reduces trading volume (by up to 50% in the case of a 1% tax).
Our results are robust to the volatility of the fundamental value. The sensitivity analysis further indicates that the Tobin taxs ability to reduce distortions (and, to a lesser extent, the volatility of returns) is inversely related to the volatility of the fundamental value. This relationship is likely because the Tobin tax subdues not only erratic oscillations of the market exchange rate but also the adjustment towards its fundamental value.
Appendix: A Figure 11 : Realization of Time Series under p = p0 and τ = 0 Notes: A realization of exchange rates capturing excess volatility and the formation of a persistent deviation during periods 120-170. The deviation emerged when several consecutive Gaussian shocks in fundamentals of negative sign happened to be sampled, which made the chartist forecasting rule more profitable. At that point, more traders adopted the chartist forecasting rule predicting a further decline of the exchange rate, which, in a self-fulfilling manner, indeed occurred. However, that speculation further increased the popularity of the chartist forecasting rule. This endogenous process continued until the market was almost exclusively populated by chartists, when, unable to fuel itself by recruiting more chartists, it finally slowed down and the exchange rate settled at an unstable equilibrium of approximately 1.02. Another Gaussian shock then occurred that triggered a similar process, except in the opposite direction.
